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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
RANCH HOMES, INC. , 
vs. 
Plaintiff-
Respondent, 
GREATER PARK CITY 
CORPORATION, 
Defendant-
Appellant. 
REPLY BRIEF 
Case No. 15467 
Appellant Greater Park City Company (hereinafter 
"GPCC") files this reply brief because of two rather sur-
prising arguments made by appellee Ranch Homes in its brief. 
First, contrary to an admission at trial, Ranch Homes' brief 
asserts that only the general character of its reliance 
damages need have been foreseeable. All of the authorities, 
however, agree that out-of-pocket expenditures are items of 
special damage. Special damages are not recoverable unless 
GPCC had notice of the special facts creating the unusual 
risk at the time of contracting. 
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Second, Ranch Homes argues in its brief that the 
doctrine of mitigation of damages does not require it to 
make another contract with GPCC, even though that contract 
would result in avoiding any loss. GPCC submits that the 
better-reasoned authority is contrary. If Ranch Homes could 
reasonably have mitigated its damages by entering into a new 
contract with GPCC, the law requires it to do so. 
I 
OUT-OF-POCKET EXPENDITURES ARE 
ITEMS OF SPECIAL DAMAGE. AT THE TIME OF 
CONTRACTING, GPCC DID NOT HAVE NOTICE OF 
ANY SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES CREATING UNUSUAL RISKS 
General damages are those which would naturally be 
expected to result from the type of breach, while special 
damages result from the circumstances particular to the case 
at hand. Prince v. Peterson, 538 P.2d 1325 (Utah Sup. Ct. 
1975); see generally, Restatement of Contracts§ 330; 22 
Am. Jur. 2d "Damages" § 15. 
General damages in Utah for breach of a land sales 
contract are the market value of the property at the time of ' 
sale less the contract price. Bunnell v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 
83, 368 P.2d 597 (1962). This gives to the vendee the 
benefit of his bargain. Beckstrom v. Beckstrom, 578 P.2d 
520 (Utah Sup. Ct. 1978). The measure of general damages 
for breach of an option agreement is the same. See Cohen_1.:. 
Lovitz, 255 F. Supp. 302 (D.D.C. 1966); Capaldi v. Burlw~ 
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~alty Core., 350 Mass. 765, 214 N.E.2d 71 (Mass. Sup. Jud. 
Ct. 1966). 
Out-of-pocket expenditures are clearly items of 
special damage. All of the authorities agree. Mendoyoma, 
Inc. v. County of Mendocino, 8 Cal. App. 3d 873, 87 Cal. 
Rptr. 740 (1970); Platts v. Arney, 50 Wash. 2d 42, 309 P.2d 
372 (1957) ("Preparatory expenses, and expenses in part per-
formance, are ..• special damages"); McCormick on Damages 
§ 8 (1935); 17 A.L.R.2d 1300, 1308-09, Anno.: "Right to recover, 
in action for breach of contract, expenditures incurred in 
preparation for performance"; cf. Travelers Indemnity Co. v. 
Chumbley, 394 S.W.2d 418, 19 A.L.R.3d 1043 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965). 
Counsel for Ranch Homes also agreed at trial that its expendi-
tures were items of special damage. (R. 314) .'!:../ 
GPCC argued in its opening brief that the general 
measure of damages for breach of an option agreement should 
be the exclusive measure of damages, and that no damages 
should be awarded for expenditures made. If the Court holds 
that special damages may be considered for breach of an 
option agreement, then the "foreseeability" test for special 
!Y Counsel for GPCC apologizes for the sa:newhat confusing nature of the 
citations to the First and Second Transcripts in its openirq brief. 
GPCC's initial brief would have cited this reference as (1st Tr., 2 at 
1) . The First Transcript (1st Tr.) starts at R. 193. The first page 
of the first volume (1 at 2) begins at R. 201, volume 2 (2 at 1) 
carmences at R. 314, and the third volume (3 at 1) starts at R. 464. 
The Second Transcript (2d Tr.) starts at R. 565. The first page of 
the proceedings (2d Tr. at 2) carrnences at R. 569. 
-3-
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damages must be closely examined. GPCC respectfully submits 
that the Lower Court erred in finding that Ranch Homes' 
expenditures were foreseeable by the parties (Finding No. 
13, 
R. 166). 
Special damages are not recoverable unless GPCC had 
notice of the special facts creating the unusual risk at the 
time of contracting. Prince v. Peterson, supra, at 1328 
(special damage should be specially "proved by evidence 
showing such circumstances in the individual case."); 22 Arn. j 
2d "Damages" § 59; 5 Corbin on Contracts § 1014 (1964); McCor4 
on Damages §§ 140-141 (1935). Only two arguments made by 
Ranch Homes could be construed as putting GPCC on notice of 
special risks. First, Ranch Homes asserts in its brief that 
GPCC had notice of the special circumstances because of a 
single conversation which occurred on an airplane between 
principals of the two parties. Second, Ranch Homes asserts 
that the option agreement itself gave GPCC notice. GPCC 
submits that both of these arguments are insufficient, and 
that reasonable minds cannot differ -- it never had sufficient' 
notice of the special circumstances creating the unusual risk 
at the time of contracting. 
In the spring of 197 4, Jim Fahs of Ranch Homes and 
Bob Wells of GPCC were seatmates on an airplane trip to 
California. (R. 233). Fahs told Wells only that he had a 
group of investors who wanted to "develop a single-family 
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residential community," and that they foresaw a real need for 
an FHA-approved type of subdivision. (Id.). Nothing more 
specific than this was ever said. Fahs never mentioned that 
Ranch Hornes would definitely seek FHA financing, only that 
there appeared to be a market in Park City for such a housing 
project. Fahs never stated that financing would be sought 
before exercise of the option, or that all of the design work 
and planning would be completed for all of the phases of the 
project, including the housing units, prior to the exercise 
of the option. Also, Fahs never related that Ranch Homes was 
going to design its housing development in an extraordinary 
manner with "cluster" housing at the end of cul-de-sac streets, 
and with unusual planting islands in the middle of each 
cul-de-sac. Can it be said that GPCC had notice of these and 
all of the other special and extraordinary circumstances at 
the time of signing the Option Agreement when Ranch Homes' intent 
"from the outset", according to Fahs, was that a purchaser could 
have bought a lot and built his own house upon the property 
without using their plans? (R. 956-960). 
The option agreement itself does not provide any 
notice to GPCC of the special items of damage which may be 
suffered by Ranch Homes. It contains typical option provisions, 
and, upon exercise, it was to serve as a land sales contract. 
Most of the provisions cited in respondent's brief related 
to conveyances of the property after exercise of the option. 
-5-
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.... 
(See pp. 3-5, 11 and 12 of Ranch Hornes' brief). Th 
e only 
restriction upon the use of the property contained in the 
option agreement is that Ranch Hornes, upon exercise of the 
option, utilized it for the development of a single-fa~~ 
residential homesite for a period of 20 years, unless specific 
approval is obtained from GPCC to utilize it for some other 
purpose. (See Plaintiff's Ex. 2, the Option Agreement, at 
,I 10. All exhibits are found at R. 192). The option agree-
ment does not give notice to GPCC of the type of financing, 
if any, Ranch Homes proposes for the property; the type of 
design it contemplates for the housing development; the type 
of expenditures it will incur prior to exercise of the 
option; or any clue to the other unusual types of expenditures 
as outlined on pages 5 through 7 of Appellant's opening brief. 
Whether Ranch Homes chose to exercise the option one week afte:' 
it was executed without making any expenditures or seven montl'i 
later after making extraordinary preparations was completely 
within its discretion. Only Ranch Homes could control what 
expenditures were to be made, and the option agreement never 
gave GPCC any notice of special circumstances. 
The authorities support the position that mere 
knowledge of Ranch Homes' intent to develop a single-family : 
housing project cannot impose upon GPCC the legal responsibilL 
to foresee the unusual types of 
the exercise of the option. In 
-6-
expenditures incurred prior t: 
the leading case of ~ 
.. 
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ic 
') 
co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540 (1903), Mr. Justice 
Holmes had occasion to consider an action for breach of a sales 
contract. In addition to claiming damages for the difference 
between the contract price of the commodity (oil) and the market 
value at the time of breach, plaintiff sued for special damages. 
The contract was silent as to how plaintiff intended to transport 
the oil. Plaintiff, however, alleged that both parties understood 
it would rent tank cars to be filled at defendant's location. 
Because of defendant's breach, plaintiff claimed it had been 
specially damaged because of the commitment it made to send 
the tank cars 1,000 miles to defendant's location. 
In affirming the granting of defendant's motion to 
dismiss, the Court stated: 
"It may be said with safety that mere notice 
to a seller of some interest or probable action 
of the buyer is not enough necessarily and as 
matter of law to charge the seller with special 
damage . . [I]t is obvious that the plaintiff 
was free to bring its tanks from where it liked,--
a thousand miles away or an adjoining yard,--so 
far as the contract was concerned. The allegation 
hardly amounts to saying that the defendant had 
notice that the plaintiff was likely to send its 
cars from a distance. ***The knowledge must be 
brought home to the party sought to be charged, 
under such circumstances that he must know that 
the person he contracts with reasonably bel'ieves 
that he accepts the contract with the special 
condition attached to it." 
Id. at 545. 
Similarly, in Mendoyoma, supra, the appellant sought to recover, 
~nte£ alia, for $14,237.33 interest paid on loans which it had 
-7-
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obtained to fund the initial development of its bu · 
s1ness v~nt 
In excluding this item of special damage, the California c 
our: 
of Appeals stated: 
"In the present case the record is devoid of 
any evidence that performance of the contract 
was to be financed through loans. * * * 
Certainly it cannot be said that appellant's 
resorting to borrowing, and the subsequent 
obligation to pay interest, was foreseeable 
by either party at the time of contracting 
II 
87 Cal. Rptr. at 744. 
In the instant case, GPCC had no notice at the time 
of contracting of the special circumstances creating the unus, 
risks. If this Court sustains the findings of the Trial cour: 
it will be equivalent to a pronouncement that all types of 
expenditures are foreseeable during an option period. It is 
improbable that GPCC undertook to guarantee performance with 
such extreme special damages in mind. The option price of 
$10, 000 was a mere 2% of the sales price of $510, 000. There 
simply no evidence to show that GPCC had notice of any specia. 
circumstances at the time of contracting. 
One final point raised in Ranch Homes' brief needs 
response. To be recoverable as special damages, out-of-pockr 
expenditures must not only be specifically foreseeable, but 
they must also be "reasonably" incurred. Restatement of 
Contracts § 333. Assuming arguendo that GPCC did have notice 
of the special circumstances, the testimony of Mr. Trayner an 
Professor Hashimoto vividly demonstrates that the expendituri 
made by Ranch Homes were not reasonably incurred. The testi· 
many of these two expert witnesses was the only testimony 
-8-
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outlining the industry standards which should be followed 
by a reasonably prudent developer after obtaining an option 
but before exercising it. Their testimony was not impeached, 
nor was it controverted by the testimony of Ranch Hornes' 
principals or its witnesses. In fact, Max Engeman, executive 
vice president of First Security State Bank, one of plaintiff's 
witnesses who was called to explain the customary practices 
of bankers with respect to the making of real estate loans, 
confirmed Mr. Trayner's testimony. (R. 901). 
Although a trier of fact is vested with broad 
discretion, it is not without limit. It is a fundamental rule 
of evidence that the uncontroverted testimony of a credible 
witness may not be arbitrarily disregarded by the trier of fact. 
Cottrell v. Grand Union Tea Co., 5 Utah 2d 187, 299 P.2d 622 
(1956); Wirz v. Wirz, 96 Cal. App. 2d 171, 214 P.2d 839, 15 
A.L.R.2d 1129 (1950). Where the testimony of a witness, 
whether expert or lay, is uncontradicted and not inherently 
improbable, and there are no circumstances, such as impeach-
ment, to raise a doubt as to its truth, the facts so proven 
must be taken as conclusively established and a decision 
entered accordingly. American Scale Mfg. Co. v. Zee, 120 Utah 
402, 235 P.2d 361 (1951); Stafos v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 
367 F.2d 314 (10th Cir. 1966). 
Based upon the foregoing, GPCC submits that the 
clear weight and credibility of the evidence points to only 
-9-
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one conclusion -- that it did not have notice of the sp . 
ec1a1 
facts creating the unusual risks at the time of contract~ 
and that the expenditures made by Ranch Hornes were not 
reasonable. 
II 
RANCH HOMES COULD HAVE MITIGATED ITS DAMAGES 
BY ENTERING INTO A NEW CONTRACT WITH GPCC 
g, 
Ranch Hornes argues in its brief that the doctriM 
of mitigation of damages does not require it to make another 
contract with GPCC, even though that contract would result ir. 
avoiding any loss. This argument is contrary to the policy 
behind the doctrine of mitigation and the better-reasoned 
authority. 
The policy behind the rule of mitigation is that a 
plaintiff must use a "reasonable effort" to avoid his own dac 
See generally, Restatement of Contracts ~ 336 & 22 Am. Jur. 1; 
"Damages" § 33. Therefore, as a general rule an employee who 
has been wrongfully discharged is bound to accept his employe: 
offer of reemployment in the same or a similar position in or: 
to reduce the damages, where such reemployment may be accepte: 
without prejudice to the employee's rights under the original 
contract. 72 A.L.R. 1049, 1054, Anno: "Employer's offer to 
take back employee wrongfully discharged as affecting former' 
liability." In the case of failure by a contractor to delive: 
goods or render services, it is usually required that the 
· · h bl effort secure other similar goo: plaintiff throug reasona e 
-10-
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or obtain another workman. Restatement of Contracts § 336, 
comment b on Subsection (1). If a reasonably prudent person 
acting under the circumstances in which the plaintiff found 
himself would have minimized the claimed losses by entering 
into another contract with a third party, this may also be 
shown in mitigation of damages. 22 Am. Jur. 2d "Damages" 
§ 34. 
In the instant case, GPCC was unable to perform 
on the option agreement because of its financial inability 
to bring a road and utilities to the subject property, 
which was located at the northerly edge of an area known 
v 
as the Holiday Ranch. GPCC made several offers of other 
more accessible property to Ranch Homes. These offers would 
not have required the expenditure of additional sums of money 
by Ranch Homes. GPCC proposed to sell these other tracts of 
land at substantially less than the $17,000 per acre Ranch 
Homes agreed to pay for the optioned property. 
There is a split of authority as to whether a plaintiff 
may be required to enter into a new contract with the defaulting 
party. 22 Am. Jur. 2d "Damages" § 35; 46 A.L.R. 1192, Anno: 
"Duty to minimize damages by accepting offer modified by party 
who has breached contract of sale." As Professor Corbin stated: 
Y The facts dealing with mitigation of damages are set out in detail 
on pp. 22-25 of GPCC's opening brief. Only a concise sunmary is 
given here. 
-11-
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"Courts have held that it is not necessary 
for the plaintiff to make another contract 
with the defendant who has repudiated, even 
though he offers terms that would result 
in avoiding loss. Other courts have held 
otherwise, however, if no personal humiliation 
or great inconvenience is involved in making 
the new contract." 
5 Corbin on Contracts § 1043 (1964). 
GPCC submits that the better-reasoned authority wou1: 
deny recovery to Ranch Homes for failing to enter into a ne'• 
contract with GPCC because it could have reasonably mitigate. 
its damages by doing so. Any other rule would be contrary t: 
the policy of the doctrine in requiring a plaintiff to ~t 
reasonably in reducing his damages. There is no valid disti: 
between the instant circumstances and those requiring an emp; 
to accept an offer of reemployment, those which require a mer 
to cover by purchasing other goods or services, and those ck 
stances which generally require a plaintiff to enter into anc 
contract with a third party. As the Ten th Circuit recently i 
"A damaged party entitled to the benefl.t of 
a contract is under a duty to mitigate his 
damages, and generally speaking his rights 
are not diminished if the circumstances force 
him to deal with the party in default." 
Stanspec Corp. v. Jelco, Inc., 464 F.2d 
1184, 1187 (10th Cir. 1972). 
GPCC submits, and reasonable minds cannot differ, tho 
under the circumstances Ranch Homes could have reasonably 
mitigated its damages by entering into one of several possibl 
contracts with GPCC. Therefore, its failure to do so bars i: 
right to recovery, and the judgment below should be reversed. 
-12-
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III 
CONCLUSION 
GPCC respectfully submits that it did not have 
notice of any special circumstances creating unusual risks 
at the time of contracting, and that Ranch Homes' out-of-
pocket expenditures were not reasonable. Therefore, the 
judgment below should be reversed and a new judgment 
entered for GPCC. 
GPCC also submits that the doctrine of mitigation of 
damages required Ranch Homes to enter into a new contract with 
GPCC. Ranch Homes' refusal to do so was not reasonable under 
the circumstances of the case. Therefore, the judgment below 
should be reversed and a new judgment entered in GPCC's favor. 
Respectfully submitted this :2.'i5 day of September, 1978. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
F. s. Prince, Jr. 
Donald J. Winder 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
-13-
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